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Abstract. Programmable networks oﬀer the ability to customize router
behaviour at run time, thus increasing ﬂexibility of network administra-
tion. Programmable network routers are conﬁgured using domain-speciﬁc
languages. The ability to evolve router programs dynamically creates po-
tential for misconﬁgurations. By exploiting domain-speciﬁc abstractions,
we are able to translate router conﬁgurations into Promela and validate
them using the Spin model checker, thus providing reasoning support for
our domain-speciﬁc language. To evaluate our approach we use our con-
ﬁguration language to express the IETF’s Diﬀerentiated Services speciﬁ-
cation and show that industrial-sized DiﬀServ router conﬁgurations can
be validated using Spin on a standard PC.
1 Introduction
Most routers in use in the current Internet are rather simple; they receive pack-
ets from one network interface, investigate the packet header that encodes the
target IP address and forward them a router that is closer to the target. Most
current routers implement the so-called best-eﬀort model, which implies that
all packets are equal citizens; they are all processed in the same manner. There
are, however, applications, such as audio-conferencing or video-on-demand, that
could be improved by quality of service (QoS) guarantees provided by the net-
work. Moreover, there are diﬀerent classes of users; companies might be prepared
to pay a premium for performance and bandwidth guarantees. These guarantees
cannot be given with the current best-eﬀort model of the Internet.
To address this question, a relatively novel strand of network research in-
vestigates programmable networks [2], which give up the assumption that every
network packet is handled in the same way by a router. Instead, the router exe-
cutes a program that controls more intelligently how network packets are to be
handled and forwarded to other networks. Such programmable routers can then
be used to implement QoS Internet standards, such as the Diﬀerentiated Services
model (DiﬀServ) [1]. DiﬀServ suggests marking packets in order to identify their
service class at boundary routers so that then network traﬃc can be shaped by2 Luca Zanolin, Cecilia Mascolo, and Wolfgang Emmerich
delaying low class packets or even dropping them. The identiﬁcation of service
classes, conditions on shaping and dropping, and traﬃc management can then be
implemented in router programs and thus diﬀerent qualities of network services
can be provided by a set of programmable routers.
The rise of programmable routers implies two interesting software engineering
research questions. Firstly, router programs need to be changed on a regular basis
in order to introduce new services without having to shut down the routers.
Secondly, prior to updating a single router or a set of routers with a new router
program, network administrators may want to check that their programs do not
compromise network performance and reliability.
The main contribution of this paper is a solution to the second question. We
describe a high-level router programming language that can be used to deﬁne
the packet processing performed by a programmable router. We deﬁne the se-
mantics of the language in an operational manner by mapping it to Promela, the
speciﬁcation language deﬁned for Spin [8]. We then show how linear temporal
logic (LTL) [13] can be used to specify safety and liveness properties for a router
and demonstrate that Spin can eﬃciently and eﬀectively check whether a given
router program meets these properties. We discuss an evaluation of our approach
using a set of DiﬀServ router programs and show how the model checking sup-
port is integrated into a network administration environment. By focusing on the
software engineering aspect of this inter-disciplinary project, this paper presents
an interesting case study for the systematic engineering of an application-speciﬁc
conﬁguration language whose deﬁnition has been inspired by graphical architec-
ture description languages, the deﬁnition of its operational semantics and the
provision of reasoning support using model checking techniques.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy introduce the
notion of programmable routers and describe our router conﬁguration language.
We deﬁne the operational semantics of the conﬁguration language in Section 3
by mapping it to Promela. In Section 4 we show how we use that mapping to
prove router properties with Spin. In Section 5, we evaluate our approach and in
Section 6 we compare it to related work. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss future
research directions of this project.
2 Programmable Routers
A programmable router can be conﬁgured in order to exploit the network re-
sources according to diﬀerent requirements. There are many applications of pro-
grammable routers, including ﬁrewalls that can rapidly respond to denial of
service attacks, virtual private networks, traﬃc shaping, and provision of con-
ﬁgurable quality of services.
We have implemented a programmable router, called Promile [12]. Promile
is composed of two layers: the Router Kernel and the XML-bAsed Middleware
(XAM). The kernel deals with packet forwarding, while XAM manages the router
conﬁguration. XAM presents the administrators with an abstraction of the rout-
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ify old ones. We call the router abstraction conﬁguration, because it conﬁgures
how the router manages packets. The conﬁguration is a high level abstraction,
described by a set of modules.
When a packet is received by the router, it is given to a module, that, after
applying a function, sends it to the next module. When the packet reaches
the last module, the packet is re-injected into the network and forwarded to
the next hop. According to its class and its header, a packet can go through
diﬀerent modules allowing the router to provide diﬀerent services to diﬀerent
packet ﬂows.
In order to implement qualities of service at the network level, the IETF has
recommended the Diﬀerentiated Services (DiﬀServ) model [1]. In this paper, we
use DiﬀServ to illustrate our approach to model checking programmable routers.
DiﬀServ assigns a class to each packet and DiﬀServ routers handle and forward
packets according to the class of the packet. The class of the packets is not used
as a priority, but it identiﬁes the type of service required for handling the packet.
Figure 1 is a simple example of a DiﬀServ router conﬁguration. In this sce-
nario, we suppose that the router is able to provide only two kinds of services:
video conference and ﬁle download. Brieﬂy, the ﬁrst service has to guarantee
the packet delivery with a given ﬁxed bandwidth (the service is not interested
into increasing throughput inﬁnitely, as this would not improve the quality of
a video conferencing application). The second service is interested in maximiz-
ing the packet transmission. As a consequence, we can delay packets from a
video conference only if they are above the bandwidth requirement, while if the
network is congested, we can delay or even drop the packets from a download
session. Using a DiﬀServ architecture, each service is mapped into a diﬀerent








As shown in Figure 1, the Receiver module receives packets from the network
and forwards them to the Marker module. According to the ﬁelds stored inside
the packet header, the Marker assigns packets to a particular class. In this
example, we can argue that Marker assigns the class according to the source
host; we assume that Marker knows which hosts are downloading data and
which are in a video conference session; obviously, this is a big simpliﬁcation,
but showing how to set up a DiﬀServ network is beyond the scope of this paper.
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When packets have been dealt with by Marker, they are sent to the Classiﬁer
module that, according to their class, routes them into the upper path, that
is, the video conference/ﬁrst class path, or into the lower path, that is, the
download/second class path. When the packets are routed into the upper path,
they go through the Shaper module, that is able to delay them. Otherwise,
the packets can be routed into the lower path and go through the Shaper and
Dropper modules where the packets can be delayed (Shaper) or even dropped
(Dropper) in order to reduce network congestion. We now use this example to
brieﬂy introduce the concept of our application-speciﬁc language.
2.1 Modules
Modules are the basic building blocks of router conﬁgurations. By interconnect-
ing modules and parameterizing their behaviour, we deﬁne the conﬁguration of
the router that provides the desired services. A module is a black box that ap-
plies a function to incoming packets. Modules communicate with other modules
through gates. A packet is received from an input gate and sent through an
output gate. A module can have multiple input gates in order to distinguish
diﬀerent kinds of packets. Most modules have both input and output gates, with
two exceptions. A module with only output gates receives incoming packets from
the network; this kind of module is called source module and usually describes an
input network interface. Similarly, a module that only has input gates forwards
packets into the network; this module is called sink and it models an output
network interface. When a packet reaches the router, it is ﬁrstly managed by a
source module and, after being processed by a conﬁguration is sent to the next
router or its destination by a sink module.
2.2 Rules
A module can be conﬁgured through a set of rules. According to these rules,
the module applies its internal functionalities only to a sub-set of the incoming
packets and it routes them through its output gates. A rule identiﬁes packets
through a set of ﬁelds related to the packet header and to the environment. The
ﬁeld sets may be diﬀerent depending on the module’s behaviour; this ﬂexibility
allows to precisely identify when a module functionality should be applied.
Num Source Destination Class
TCP IP TCP IP
1. 10 128.16.8.57 20 128.16.10.27 1
2. 10 128.16.10.27 * * 2
3. 1000 * 1000 * 10
4. 1200 * * * 10
Table 1. Rules
Table 1 shows a sample rule set of the Marker module. It describes how
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addresses. For instance, the ﬁrst rule identiﬁes the packet class by specifying both
source and destination packet address and assigns it to the ﬁrst class. Using these
rules, we can ﬂexibly parameterise the behaviour of individual module instances.
2.3 Connections
Connections start from an output gate and lead into an input gate describing
the packet ﬂow among the modules. Connections can describe complex module
graphs that should comply with the following properties. Firstly, any output
gate must be connected to an input gate to fully specify the packet forwarding
from module to module. Secondly, only one connection can start from an output
gate. This ensures that the packet forwarding is deterministic. Finally, multiple
connections may end in the same input gate and they may deﬁne elaborated
router conﬁguration with loops.
2.4 Conﬁguration Update
The module instances, their interconnections, as well as the rules that have
been used to parameterise the behaviour of module instances determine the
conﬁguration of a router. The management of these conﬁgurations for a Promile
router is an important aim of the work described in this paper. The network
administrator is able to change the router conﬁguration without stopping it
and, moreover, without any traﬃc disruption; as a consequence, the network can
quickly react to changes in its environment, updating its conﬁguration according
to the application requirements.
When a network administrator, or an automatic tool, wants to update the
router conﬁguration, they have to deal only with the router abstraction provided
by Promile. Prior to deﬁning a new conﬁguration, the administrator wants to
be sure that the new conﬁguration is meaningful. In order to do so, we have to
support the deﬁnition of invariant properties.
2.5 Properties
The properties that network administrators might want to prove can be divided
into three groups: routing, service, and performance properties.
Routing properties are concerned with the router and they deﬁne how the
packet should be managed independently from provided services (i.e., video con-
ference support); these properties guarantee that the router always works cor-
rectly and it is eventually able to handle new incoming packets. As these prop-
erties are not service-speciﬁc, they are almost the same for all the routers in
the network and they are usually deﬁned by the router developers. For instance,
a routing property could be concerned with the module graph; as we have de-
scribed, the module connections may be cyclic and this might cause packets to
loop inﬁnitely in the graph if this behaviour is not prevented by the conﬁguration
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Service properties are concerned with the services that are to be implemented
with a router conﬁguration. With these properties, we want to guarantee that
the conﬁguration provides the services correctly. As these properties are service
dependent, they can change from router conﬁguration to router conﬁguration. In
general, they can be deﬁned by administrators. For instance, an administrator
can require that some functions are never applied to particular packets (i.e, never
drop packets of premium users).
Performance properties are concerned with the router performance and they
try to maximize router throughput through an optimisation of the conﬁguration.
Both service and routing properties are necessary, while performance properties
are not vital. However, as optimal performance is an important feature for any
router, we argue that a router has also to satisfy this kind of properties. Perfor-
mance properties may be deﬁned by the network administrator, but also by the
router developer. A performance property, for example, may want to forbid that
a packet is ﬁrst marked and then dropped by the router, as this would make the
router wasting time marking the packet that, instead, should have been dropped
straight away.
Another performance property that should be checked is concerned with rules
and modules. According to the router packet ﬂow, some rules could be irrelevant,
as no packets match them. In order to increase the router speed these should
be removed. We should also check if all the modules are reachable by a packet,
otherwise we should remove them.
3 Operational Semantics
In order to prove that the router satisﬁes desired properties, we translate the
router conﬁguration into a formal speciﬁcation. We can then apply model check-
ing techniques to validate the router conﬁguration against the desired properties.
By deﬁning this translation, we give an operational semantics to the router con-
ﬁguration language.
We split this translation into two steps. The ﬁrst step translates the router
conﬁguration into an intermediate representation, which describes each module
through a set of components; the second step produces a Promela speciﬁcation
that deﬁnes the operational semantics and can be model checked by Spin. We
assume that the Promile module types may be developed by third parties. In
order to enable model checking of router conﬁgurations that instantiate such
third party module types, module developers have to deﬁne the semantics of
their module types. The ﬁrst advantage of our two stage mapping is that we
have deﬁned the intermediate representation in such a way that it is relatively
straightforward for a module developer to deﬁne the semantics of a module type
using that intermediate representation.
We now describe the intermediate representation and its mapping to the
Promela language.Model Checking Programmable Router Conﬁgurations 7
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The intermediate representation supports four component types: source (SO),
selector (SE), executor (EX), and sink (SI) (Figure 2). A source (Figure 2a)
forwards new packets to the next component; this component does not actually
create packets, but it directly takes them from the network. A selector (Fig-
ure 2b) receives packets and routes them to one of possibly several components
according to selection rules that it applies. The selector is working as a multi-
plexer, where the rules describe how the incoming packet must be forwarded to
the next component. A selector has one input and a list of numbered outputs; if
a received packet matches no rules, it is sent through the default output (0). An
executor (Figure 2c) receives packets and forwards them after applying a func-
tion. An executor applies the same function to all packets that it processes. A
sink (Figure 2d) deﬁnes the end of the packet path. Arrows denote connections
between components and they determine packet ﬂows.
A DiﬀServ module of type Dropper could be mapped into the intermediate
representation shown in Figure 3. The semantics of this module type is described
using a selector component (SE) that chooses the packets that should be dropped
and forwards them to the executor component (EX) that applies the module
speciﬁc function (i.e., drops packets) and sends them to the sink component (SI)




Fig.3. Translation of a Dropper Module
The next step is to translate this intermediate representation into a formal
speciﬁcation language (i.e., Promela) in order to be able to model check the
router conﬁguration.
3.2 Promela Speciﬁcation
The Promela speciﬁcation that is derived from an intermediate representation
is composed of a set of processes that can communicate with each other. Each
process corresponds to a component and it formally describes how a packet is
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relationship between the intermediate component types and Promela process
types (process source, process selector, process executor, and process sink).
Promela processes communicate with each other through a set of global vari-
ables, that describe the packet properties. These global variables are accessible
by all processes that can read and modify them. We have introduced some extra
variables for modelling the packet forwarding and the environment; one of them
is the variable exec that describes the functions that are applied to packets; by
monitoring the value of this variable, we can check which functions are applied
and in which order.
All processes have a similar structure; a process waits until it receives a
packet, then executes its statement, such as routing packets to diﬀerent pro-
cesses, or applying functions to them (i.e., dropping). For instance, Figure 4
shows a simpliﬁed version of the Promela code for a selector process that cor-
responds to a selector component; the selector process chooses the process to
handle the incoming packet; through a sequence of if statements, the process
checks the value of the packet ﬁelds and identiﬁes the next process (setting the
variable next_proc). The else statement is executed if the packet ﬁelds do not
match any of the other conditions (line 6). We assume that at most one condition
is true for a particular value of the packet ﬁelds, avoiding a non-deterministic
evolution of the process.
1. proctype p_2() {
2. (next_proc==p_id_2);
3. if
4. ::(TCPS==1000 && TCPD==1000)->next_proc=p_id_3;
5. ::(TCPS==1200) -> next_proc=p_id_3;
6. ::else -> next_proc=p_id_4;
7. fi;}
Fig.4. Selector Process
A subset of rules deﬁned in Table 1 are mapped into this selector process. For
instance, the rule on line 4 corresponds to the rule on line 3 in Table 1, where
the rule describes packets from TCP source port 1000 going to TCP destination
port 1000.
The router model, which is translated into the Promela speciﬁcation, han-
dles one packet at a time. This simpliﬁcation of the model does not limit the
analysis of a real router, as we can assume that the presence of a packet does not
inﬂuence the management of other packets inside the physical router; in fact,
the concurrent management of packets speeds up only the router throughput
without any inﬂuence in the packet handling.Model Checking Programmable Router Conﬁgurations 9
4 Model Checking Promile
Given the Promela speciﬁcation we can now prove properties on the router con-
ﬁguration using the Spin model checker. The router model must be checked ex-
haustively to guarantee that the router conﬁguration is acceptable. This implies
checking that all packets reaching the router are handled correctly.
To attain this goal, we cannot generate the set of all possible packets, with
all possible header ﬁeld settings, as this would lead to exponential growth of the
state space; even considering only the ﬁeld values referenced by the rules, the
packet growth is still exponential. In fact, if we call P the set of the packets that
we need to inject into the router model, and we consider the worst-case scenario
where all the rules refer to diﬀerent ﬁeld values, the cardinality of this set is
shown in (1), where r is the average number of the rules in each module, m the
number of modules, and f the number of ﬁelds in each rule.







∗ ri + 1 , k = min(maxpath,f) (2)
However, the cardinality of P can be limited considering groups of packets,
which we will call packet ﬂows, instead of single packets, observing the structure
of the router conﬁguration and exploiting the relationships among the rules.
Following this idea, we can generate less packet ﬂows and reduce the cardinality
of the set P as shown in (2). The cardinality of P still grows exponentially, but
the base is reduced from m ∗ r to r; the exponent is also reduced and is the
minimum between the number of ﬁelds and the maximum number of the router
modules that a packet can traverse (maxpath). Moreover, the cardinality of P
is described by an upper bound, reached only in the worst-case. In Appendix A
a proof of the fact that (2) is an improvement of (1) can be found. In the next
section we give an intuitive justiﬁcation of the formula in (2).
4.1 Flow generation
In this section we show how reasoning on packet ﬂows instead of single packets
allows us to limit the exponential growth of our model. In Section 5, we will then
show that ﬂows suﬃciently abstract the state space to enable model checks of
real-life router conﬁgurations.
As packets are identiﬁed by a set of ﬁelds, a ﬂow can be described by a sub-
set of ﬁelds. Following this approach, we group together packets that have some
of the ﬁelds set to the same value, ignoring the other ﬁelds that can assume
potentially all the possible values. For instance, if the rules inside the router
use only two ﬁelds (the TCP ports of source (TCPS) and destination (TCPD)),
a ﬂow can be described as in (3). Flow f1 contains all the packets, with ﬁelds
set to speciﬁc values of TCPS and TCPD. In this case, the ﬂow is said to be
fully-deﬁned, as all ﬁelds have a value. On the other hand, ﬂow f2 is undeﬁned10 Luca Zanolin, Cecilia Mascolo, and Wolfgang Emmerich
as the value of TCPD is not set; we say that ﬂow f1 is more deﬁned than f2, as
it is a subset of f2 (5).
f1 = {(TCPS,TCPD)|TCPS = 1 ∧ TCPD = 1} (3)
f2 = {(TCPS,TCPD)|TCPS = 1 ∧ TCPD = null} (4)
f1 ⊂ f2 (5)
In order to prove that the router behaves correctly, we check the router
conﬁguration against a set of ﬂows that cover all diﬀerent paths inside the router.
We need to simulate the generation of enough ﬂows so that all the rules inside
the modules are matched by at least one ﬂow. By injecting all these ﬂows into
the router, the model checker can validate the conﬁguration and pinpoint any
router undesired behaviours.
Flows are generated using a Promela speciﬁcation derived from the interme-
diate representation of the router. Each component of the intermediate repre-
sentation is translated into Promela process and, in order to distinguish these
processes from the ones that describe the router conﬁguration, we call processes
that describe ﬂow generation network processes, while router processes those that
describe the physical router. The connections among the network processes are
the same as in the router processes.
The source component is translated into a network process that generates
a fully-undeﬁned ﬂow that represents the packets that can reach the router.
This ﬂow will be deﬁned more accurately while traversing the selector network
processes; the selector network processes correspond to selector components and
redeﬁne the packet ﬂow according to their rules. We say that a ﬂow matches
a rule when all ﬁelds have a compatible value; a ﬂow ﬁeld is compatible with
a rule ﬁeld if it has the same value or if it is undeﬁned. When a packet ﬂow
matches a rule, the selector network process redeﬁnes the setting of ﬁelds to the
value described in the rule. As a ﬂow can match more than one rule, the selector
network process randomly chooses one of them.
A simpliﬁed network process of a selector component is shown in Figure 5.
At line 4 the rule has two ﬁelds (TCP source and destination port of the packet);
in order to match this rule, the ﬂow has to have the ﬁelds undeﬁned or set to
same values of the rule.
The sink component is mapped into a network process that behaves as a
bridge between the network and the router processes; when it receives a ﬂow, it
simply forwards it to the router processes. An executor component is mapped
into a forwarding process that receives a ﬂow and forwards it to the next process;
the functions applied by this component are irrelevant for the ﬂow generation
and they are not modelled.
The number of diﬀerent ﬂows determines the state space of model checker.
The formula in (2) describes the upper bound of the ﬂow set cardinality for
the following reason. Consider a simple scenario where packets have only one
relevant ﬁeld (A), and where each module has the same number of rules r. The
network source process deﬁnes a ﬂow where the ﬁeld A is set to null (i.e., a fully-









6. ::else -> next_proc=np_id_4;
7. fi;}
Fig.5. Selector Network Process
network sink process. We can argue that a fully-deﬁned ﬂow (i.e., where all ﬁelds
have values) can evolve only through deterministic steps, as there is at most one
rule that can match it; on the contrary, a ﬂow where the ﬁeld is undeﬁned can
match all the r rules and then can evolve in r diﬀerent ways; moreover, when a
ﬂow matches a rule it becomes fully-deﬁned, as the ﬁeld is being set by the rule
(and there is only one ﬁeld per packet in the example). As a consequence, if a
non-deﬁned ﬂow reaches every process that has r rules, we obtain (6), where m
is the number of modules in our model.
P <= r ∗ m (6)
If we want to fully validate the router conﬁguration, we need to also generate
a ﬂow matching no rules, so in reality we need to generate r ∗ m + 1 ﬂows. This
corresponds to the formula in (2) with f = 1.
The scenario with f = 1 can be extended for a generic value of f. A ﬂow
that has f ﬁelds can match f diﬀerent rules in the worst-case, i.e., each rule sets
the value of only one ﬁeld of the ﬂow. For instance, let us consider a ﬂow that
is described by two ﬁelds, A and B, and a router conﬁguration composed of two
modules that have r rules each; moreover, we also assume that the rules inside
the ﬁrst module refer to ﬁeld A, while the ones in the second module to ﬁeld
B. We now inject a fully-undeﬁned ﬂow; as ﬁeld A has no value, the ﬂow can
match any rule and its ﬁeld may be set to the value described in one of the rules.
The evolution of the ﬂow is non-deterministic and can evolve in r + 1 diﬀerent
ways (matching r diﬀerent rules or matching none). When this set of r+1 ﬂows
reaches the second module, the ﬂow evolution is more complex. Each ﬂow can
match any of the rules, as ﬁeld B is undeﬁned. Moreover, the ﬂow can traverse
the module without matching any rule. Therefore, the r +1 ﬂows can match all
the rules, and we obtain (r +1)∗r ﬂows, or they do not match any rule and we
are left with r + 1 ﬂows. Then we can deduce the formula:










∗ r + 1
This formula is formula (2) with f = 2. The idea can be extended considering
m modules and f ﬁelds obtaining formula (2) .12 Luca Zanolin, Cecilia Mascolo, and Wolfgang Emmerich
4.2 Proving Router Properties
We can prove that the router conﬁguration complies with a set of deﬁned prop-
erties. The property validation is based on a simpliﬁcation of the router model;
the router model is able to manage only one packet ﬂow at a time, and moreover,
after that, it is turned oﬀ. Obviously this behaviour is not the same of a physical
router, but, if we can prove that the router model is able to handle correctly a
single packet ﬂow, then the real router will be also able to handle a sequence of
packets.
The prove of some properties is embedded into the speciﬁcation; for instance,
we can deduce which rules are not used by reasoning about the unreachable
code of the Promela speciﬁcation, and ﬁnd out which rules or modules should be
removed from the router conﬁguration. Moreover, through the assertion mech-
anism supported by Spin and embedded in the speciﬁcation, we can verify that
no packet is going to loop inside the router simply asserting that no module will
receives two, or more, packet ﬂows.
Finally, we can deﬁne generic properties using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
Through LTL, we can deﬁne the sequences of functions that have to be applied to
every packet and forbidden sequences. In this way, we can formalize the router,
service, and performance properties, as deﬁned in Section 2.5. For instance, a
service property is described in (7). This property requires that the packet that
belongs to a particular host will never be dropped; the packets are identiﬁed
through the term fromHost(A). The other LTL property (8) is concerned with
router performance. This property forbids dropping a packet that was previously
marked inside the same router.
2(fromHost(A) =⇒ 2(¬dropPacket())) (7)
2(markPacket() =⇒ 2(¬dropPacket())) (8)
5 Evaluation
Our work aims at minimizing the validation time of a router conﬁguration. This
operation must be ﬂexible enough to accommodate any network change and
must be relatively fast to be used interactively by the administrator. According
to the requirements of the network administrator, the validation can be done
on-line before applying the operation, or oﬀ-line if the router update cannot be
delayed (e.g. during a denial of service attack).
We have tested several realistic router conﬁgurations and in particular we
have evaluated two diﬀerent conﬁgurations: a 1-level tree and a sequence of mod-
ules. We have chosen these two conﬁgurations so that our approach reaches the
best and the worse performance, respectively. In fact, the number of generated
packet ﬂows is related to the number of modules that a packet can traverse; in
the ﬁrst case, there are only 2, the root and the leaf, while in the second case all


















Fig.6. Model Checker Performance
and the rules concern the same ﬁelds (three), while the number of rules goes
from 7 to 8,500. We have chosen to change the number of rules, as, from our
experience, the number of modules or ﬁelds is usually three or four orders of
magnitude lower than the number of rules; it is then more relevant to prove how
our approach scales according to rules, instead of other parameters. As these two
conﬁgurations produce the worse and the best performance of our tool, they also
represent an upper and a lower performance bound for a router conﬁguration
with the same number of modules, rules, and ﬁelds.
In Figure 6, the lower and the upper performance bounds are enclosed in the
gray area. Interpolating the result, we have obtained the two equations shown
in (9) and in (10). Both of them have a small coeﬃcient of the second order and
in particular (9) can be approximated to a line.
y = 0.2609 ∗ x2 − 0.3319 ∗ x + 8.4093 (9)
y = 0.7653 ∗ x2 − 4,6192 ∗ x + 56,287 (10)
These tests have been performed on a PC equipped with a Xeon@1.7GHz
processor and with 1 GB of RAM. Note that a conﬁguration with seven modules
and a total of 8,500 rules is a rather complex one for this speciﬁc application
domain. We consider it remarkable that on a relatively small oﬀ-the-shelf PC we
are able to validate the worst case conﬁguration in less than 20 minutes.
6 Related Work
The related work to this project belong from diﬀerent research areas. From the
networking research area, there are two interesting projects: Click [9] and Router
Plugins [5]. Click and Router Plugins are implementations of programmable
routers, where the packet paths inside the router (i.e, the modules and their
connections) can be conﬁgured; the abstraction provided by Click is more com-
plex than our kernel, as there are more port types in order to describe the14 Luca Zanolin, Cecilia Mascolo, and Wolfgang Emmerich
behaviour of the module more precisely. Furthermore, Click and Router Plugins
do not provide a middleware layer to support the network administrator during
the conﬁguration process. However, we believe that the principles outlined in
this paper could also be applied to these projects. From the software engineer-
ing perspective, model checking techniques, as data and model abstraction, are
been investigated in [3]. The Bandera toolset [4] can verify that generic Java
code complies with a set of properties deﬁned by users; this is achieved through
model slicing and abstraction; in particular, the abstraction is manually driven
by users through a graphic interface. In our approach, the abstraction of the
model is provided by the middleware, that shows to the model checker tool a
graph of modules; as the domain of our tool is always the same, we have im-
plemented an automatic abstraction of the input data (i.e., the packets) that is
completely transparent for the network administrator and provides better per-
formance than a general purpose one; however this approach is domain speciﬁc
and cannot be applied to generic scenarios.
Model checking techniques are also applied to networking protocol research [7].
In this domain, the system is distributed and it is relevant to cope with its embed-
ded concurrency; through model checking as shown in [6], the network protocol
is speciﬁed using Promela and validated through Spin. The advantages of this
approach are mainly two. Firstly, the network protocol is designed using a spec-
iﬁcation language (i.e. Promela). Secondly, the speciﬁcation can be validated
using a model checker (i.e., Spin). Spin is used to check the correctness of the
network protocol, but it does not cope with the network conﬁguration. In fact, it
assumes that the network topology is correct and that it should work correctly
also if there are some errors. Spin checks the robustness of the protocol, but it
does not check the network environment. The aim of our work is complementary:
we do not manage the router life-cycle, but we model check its conﬁguration in
order to guarantee that it will work correctly and that it will comply with the
required properties.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have described an approach to management of programmable
networks that takes advantage of model checking techniques in order to prove
that router conﬁgurations are consistent and safe. The model checker is inte-
grated into a tool that allows the network administrator to manage a network,
conﬁdently update conﬁgurations at run time. The tool is based on a formal de-
scription that can be translated into Promela, the speciﬁcation language of Spin.
Exploiting the model checker Spin, we can prove that the router conﬁguration
is correct or, report errors to the network administrator. In terms of analysis,
we are currently able to prove that a router is providing the right services in the
right way, but we cannot check that the whole network is working as required.
The work presented in this paper shows how application-speciﬁc languages
can be designed by applying software engineering principles, how their semanticsModel Checking Programmable Router Conﬁgurations 15
can be deﬁned and most importantly that it becomes possible to apply model
checking to real-life problems by exploiting domain-speciﬁc abstractions.
The next steps of this work will go in two diﬀerent directions; through the
tool, the network administrator will be able to draw the router properties instead
of writing LTL formulas; moreover, the extension of the tool domain is relevant
in order to move the veriﬁcation from a single router to a network of routers.
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With:
m,r,f,k > 0,m ≥ k,f ≥ k
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and for f larger than 2:
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